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*Cov. L.J. 35  Introduction and Background 
The advent of DNA profiling and its development into an incredibly powerful forensic 
technique continues to raise both legal and moral issues. The Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice1 (RCCJ) recommended amending the law in order to facilitate the creation 
of a national DNA database. These recommendations were reflected in the provisions of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,2 which came into force in April 1995. These 
provisions amended the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) in order to enable 
samples suitable for DNA profiling to be taken without consent3 and to increase 
significantly the offences for which such samples could be taken.4 In addition to amending 
the law in relation to the classification and taking of samples the 1994 Act also amended 
s.64 PACE relating to the destruction of samples. These amendments did not significantly 
alter the provisions in relation to the destruction of samples but did clarify the law in 
relation to the retention of information derived from a sample. Both before and after the 
amendments, s.64 contained a requirement that samples be destroyed as soon as practical 
after an individual was acquitted of the offence,5 or after a decision was taken not to 
prosecute.6 However, following the amendments, there was a requirement that where 
samples were required to be destroyed information derived from the sample of any person 
entitled to its destruction should not be used in evidence against the person or for the 
purposes of any investigation of an offence7 . 
These provisions could be interpreted as an attempt to restore the position of the person 
charged but later acquitted, or against whom proceedings were dropped, to the same 
position as that of an individual who had not been charged in the first place. The sample 
would be destroyed and the information derived from it could not be used *Cov. L.J. 
36  against that person in the future. This position is attractive in that if we truly believe in 
the principle that an individual is innocent until proven guilty why should they not be in the 
same position that they would have been had they not come into contact with the criminal 
justice system in the first place. 
However, two high profile cases, R v B; Attorney General's Reference No 3 of 19998 and R 
v Weir,9 indicated a problem with this approach. In both cases the individuals concerned 
were implicated in serious offences (rape and murder respectively) by information (DNA 
profiles) derived from samples that should have been destroyed following an acquittal and 
the dropping of proceedings for more minor offences. In R v B the defendant was identified 
as a suspect for an offence of rape following a match between a DNA profile obtained from 
a sample taken in respect of a burglary, of which the defendant had been acquitted, and a 
DNA profile obtained from a sample recovered from the rape victim. Following this initial 
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identification of the suspect a new sample was taken and the DNA profile compared with 
that from the rape victim. It was this match that was presented at court but the sample 
from the burglary, of which the defendant had been acquitted, had been used in the 
investigation contrary to s.64(3B)(b) of PACE. The trial judge ruled the DNA evidence 
inadmissible on the ground that s.64(3B)(b) provided that samples required to be 
destroyed under s.64 (1) ‘shall not be used …for the purposes of any investigation of an 
offence’ and directed an acquittal. On a subsequent reference by the Attorney General the 
Court of Appeal upheld the judge's ruling on admissibility, holding that s.64(3B) was 
mandatory. The House of Lords, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, held that a 
breach of s.64(3B) would not automatically render evidence inadmissible as a matter of law 
but would be a matter for the judge's discretion under s.78 PACE10 . This decision was in 
line with the approach taken towards improperly obtained evidence; it is not normally 
inadmissible as a matter of law but may be excluded as the judge's discretion.11 However, 
the fact remained that, despite very cogent forensic evidence, in R v B the defendant was 
acquitted of rape and in Weir a defendant initially convicted of murder had his conviction 
quashed on appeal. 
The Attorney General's reference was heard by the House of Lords in December 2000 and 
in January 2001 the Home Secretary introduced amendments to the relevant sections of 
PACE in the House of Commons. These amendments became law in May 2001 when the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 gained Royal Assent. Section 82 of this Act amends 
s.64 PACE to permit the retention of fingerprints and samples from those subsequently 
acquitted or against whom proceedings are dropped. It provides that fingerprints or 
samples retained in these circumstances or the information derived from such samples 
may be used for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation 
of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. This is clearly a significant change in the law 
permitting, for example, a DNA profile from a sample taken in relation to an offence of 
which the defendant has *Cov. L.J. 37  been acquitted to be used in the investigation of 
subsequent offences. In addition, these changes have retrospective effect in that 
subsection (6) permits the retention and use of fingerprints and samples the destruction of 
which should have taken place before the commencement of s.82 and use of information 
from such samples12 . 
Due to the far-reaching, and to some extent controversial, nature of these amendments it 
is perhaps not surprising that the issue has come before the courts. 
The Facts 
 
S v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
In January 2001 S, a boy 12 years of age, had his fingerprints and samples for DNA 
profiling taken following his arrest and charge with attempted robbery. He had no previous 
convictions, cautions or warnings. On June 14 2001, he was acquitted of the offence. On 
July 18 2001, South Yorkshire Police wrote a letter to the solicitors acting on behalf of S, 
explaining that in accordance with s.64 PACE (as amended by the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001) the fingerprints and samples would be retained. The letter specifically 
acknowledged that the fingerprints and samples taken would have been due for destruction 
but that the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 had amended the law. At the time S's 
fingerprints and samples were taken, in January 2001, s.64 PACE required the destruction 
of such evidence as soon as practicable after acquittal. By the time S had been acquitted 
the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 had come into force permitting their retention. On 
24 July 2001, S's solicitors wrote requesting that his fingerprints and samples be 
destroyed. This was followed by a second letter, from S's solicitors to the Chief Constable 
of South Yorkshire, claiming that the retention constituted a breach of article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and that if the fingerprints and samples were not 
destroyed proceedings would be commenced for judicial review seeking a mandatory order 
for destruction and a declaration of incompatibility. A further letter was sent, by the 
solicitors, arguing that, even if the legislation were compatible with article 8, the Chief 
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Constable should consider the exercise of his discretion in each case and not adopt a 
blanket policy. 
Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
On March 13 2001 Marper was arrested and charged with harassment of his partner and his 
fingerprints and DNA samples were taken. By the time of the pre-trial review, on May 3 
2001, his partner had decided not to press the charge. On June 11 2001, the Crown 
Prosecution Service wrote to his solicitors enclosing a notice of discontinuance. On June 29 
2001, Marper's solicitors wrote requesting destruction of the fingerprints and DNA 
samples. Having received the general letter from the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
indicating the change in s.64 and that fingerprints and samples would be retained, Marper's 
solicitors wrote again requesting that the Chief Constable exercise his discretion not to 
retain either the fingerprints or the samples. The Chief Constable replied confirming that, 
save in exceptional circumstances, it was policy to retain fingerprints and samples in all 
cases. 
 *Cov. L.J. 38  The Decision of the Divisional Court 
The Divisional Court dismissed the claims by S and Marper for judicial review of the 
decision by the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire to retain their fingerprints and samples 
lawfully taken during the course of criminal investigations. Three principal issues arose 
before the Divisional Court: firstly, is the revised s.64 compatible with article 8; secondly, 
is it compatible with article 14; and thirdly, did the Chief Constable fetter his discretion. 
 Compatibility with Article 8  
Counsel for the claimants submitted that the retention of fingerprints and samples 
constitutes an interference with a person's private life contrary to article 8(1) of the 
Convention.13 The Divisional Court accepted that the taking of fingerprints and samples 
for DNA profiling, both of which are capable of identifying individuals, could constitute an 
interference with an individual's privacy capable of engaging article 8. However, it was less 
convinced that the retention of fingerprints and samples, lawfully taken, could infringe 
such a right citing McVeigh, O'Neill and Evans v United Kingdom.14 The claimants relied on 
Salonen v Finland,15 in which the European Commission of Human Rights recognised that 
the choice of forenames fell within the sphere of private life as this constituted a means of 
identifying individuals, arguing that fingerprints and DNA samples identified individuals 
and represented a physical aspect of their persona. The Divisional Court was not convinced 
by this analogy and was reinforced in its view by the fact that in Kinnunnen v Finland16 the 
Commission did not consider retention of photographs and fingerprints for some years 
after acquittal of the applicant, to be a breach of article 8(1). 
Though not certain that retention breached article 8(1) the Divisional Court went on to 
consider, assuming that there had been a breach of article 8(1), whether such an 
interference was ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society for the 
prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of others’ as provided for by article 
8(2). Counsel for the claimants argued that the retention was neither in accordance with 
the law nor necessary in a democratic society. The Court dismissed the first argument 
holding that the revised s.64 was neither uncertain nor lacking in clarity. With regard to 
whether the retention is necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder or 
crime there were three issues: firstly, whether there is a need for restriction; secondly, 
whether the restriction corresponds to a pressing social need; and finally, whether the 
restriction is ‘proportionate’. The real issue in dispute was whether the restriction is 
proportionate. The claimants' case was that a fair balance had not been struck between 
protecting their right to respect for their private life and the interests of society in 
preventing, investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. It had not been demonstrated 
that the retention of fingerprints and samples *Cov. L.J. 39  from those with no previous 
convictions, acquitted or against whom proceedings were dropped was necessary. There 
was no evidence to suggest that it was necessary in respect of the two claimants. Counsel 
for the claimants submitted that they are presumed innocent of the charge and yet the 
retention creates the suspicion that they are not innocent. It was argued that there is a 
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difference between retaining fingerprints and samples where the police have grounds for 
investigation of a specific individual for a specific offence and retaining such information 
because it may potentially prove useful in future investigations. 
The Divisional Court rejected this argument believing the claimants to be concentrating on 
the wrong issue. The court drew the distinction between compelling members of the public 
to provide fingerprints or samples, merely because the police would find them useful, and 
retaining fingerprints and samples lawfully obtained. The court felt that the protection for 
the individual lies in the legislative provisions detailing the circumstances in which the 
fingerprints and samples can be taken rather than their destruction. It highlighted the fact 
that the police are not required to destroy other evidence and intelligence gathered during 
an investigation, it is available for use in the future. The court concluded that the legislation 
relating to retention of fingerprints and samples is proportionate: the increase in serious 
crime is a pressing problem for society, fingerprints and DNA samples can provide powerful 
evidence against an individual, and interference is slight. The court thus rejected that the 
revised s.64 was incompatible with article 8. 
 Compatibility with Article 14  
The claimants argued that s.64 was incompatible with article 14,17 submitting that the fact 
that an individual ‘may’ commit an offence in the future, in the same way that any person 
without previous convictions might, cannot be ground for allowing the police to retain 
personal information. Acquitted persons should be in the same position as those who have 
neither been convicted nor are under suspicion of having committed a crime. The court 
rejected this argument and found s.64 compatible with article 14. The court held that all 
those who have lawfully been obliged to provide fingerprints and samples for the police are 
treated equally whereas those who have never been required to provide fingerprints or 
samples are not in the same position. Should the court be incorrect in holding this view 
then it was satisfied that the retention of fingerprints and samples has a ‘legitimate aim and 
objective and reasonable justification’.18 
 Had the Chief Constable Fettered his Discretion?  
The court accepted that the Chief Constable clearly had a discretion whether or not to 
retain fingerprints and samples.19 It was informed that the policy of the Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire had been to retain fingerprints and samples unless there *Cov. L.J. 
40  was a convincing distinguishing feature to the case. The court was provided with 
examples of such features e.g. a case where, prior to the amendments coming into force, 
a specific term of an agreement to be bound over was that the fingerprints and samples 
would be destroyed. The claimants argued that the governing principle in the exercise of 
the discretion should be features related to the individual such as age or the type of offence 
for which he was arrested. The court felt that this argument was flawed as the fingerprints 
and samples are not being retained specifically because the person from whom they were 
obtained is suspected of committing an offence, hence personal characteristics are not 
relevant. The court held that it was appropriate to place the burden on the person seeking 
an exception to the general policy and that the Chief Constable, through examples given to 
the court, had demonstrated a willingness to consider any request not to retain data on its 
merit. The Chief Constable had not adopted a blanket policy and had not fettered his 
discretion. The court could see no grounds for challenging the approach taken by the Chief 
Constable to the exercise of his discretion, and no reason to conclude he erred in the 
exercise of his discretion in the two cases before the court. 
The court recognised that the retention of fingerprints and samples by the police could 
arouse strong feelings and concerns. However, it felt that as a consequence of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 any extension of police powers could be challenged and tested against the 
provisions of the Convention. The court dismissed the applications, holding s.64(1A) to be 
compatible with the Convention and that there was no ground for striking down the 
discretion exercised by the Chief Constable in relation to retention of fingerprints and 
samples either generally or specifically in the cases before the court. 
Commentary 
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The amendments to s.64 constitute a significant change in the law. Without doubt the 
larger the fingerprint and DNA databases the greater the chance that a fingerprint or 
sample from an unsolved crime will match an entry on the database and thus the greater 
the value of these databases in criminal investigations. However, this must be balanced by 
recognition of the great concern members of the public may have in having their 
fingerprints and samples retained on databases. Prior to the amendments the dividing line 
fell between those convicted of a recordable offence and those with no convictions, with the 
exception of individuals being investigated for criminal offences or awaiting trial. However, 
on acquittal or if proceedings were dropped, the fingerprints and samples of these 
individuals would be destroyed and if not destroyed could not be used for the investigation 
of offences or in evidence against them. The amendments have moved the dividing line, 
which now falls between those who have been investigated for an offence and those who 
have not. It is perhaps not surprising that those acquitted or against whom proceedings are 
dropped may feel aggrieved that they have not been returned to the position they were in 
before coming into contact with the criminal justice system. The amended provisions 
themselves show recognition of the unease members of the public may feel concerning the 
retention of fingerprints and samples in that they provide for fingerprints and samples 
taken from persons not suspected of having committed the offence to be destroyed. This 
provision is designed to encourage members of the public to assist in the investigation of 
offences; for example where the police wish to undertake a mass screen and ask all the 
inhabitants of a particular geographical area to submit to the taking of samples for *Cov. 
L.J. 41  elimination purposes s.64(3)20 provides for their fingerprints and samples to be 
destroyed. 
Having recognised there is concern amongst the public at such retention, it is necessary to 
consider whether the concern is reasonable and whether despite that concern the 
government should have expanded the law. In the retention of fingerprints and samples 
the material retained is very specific and is not open to meaningful publication, it is used by 
specialists in the investigation of offences. The concern by members of the public may be 
due to a misunderstanding of the nature of the material held; for example at present the 
DNA profile held does not provide personal information on an individual, so it could not be 
used by an insurance company to investigate potential genetic predisposition to disease. A 
clear explanation of the nature of the material held could alleviate this concern. 
Alternatively, concern could centre around the potential for future use to match against 
material taken from the scene of a crime. It is possible to argue that a law-abiding citizen 
has nothing to fear from retention of their samples. Finally, a person who has not been 
convicted of an offence may simply object to personal information being retained. 
With regard to this final argument the Divisional Court felt that there was little if any 
ground for holding that article 8(1) was engaged, in that it felt the invasion of privacy 
occurs at the time the sample is taken, the protection for the individual being the legislation 
governing the taking of samples, and not through the retention of samples. Although the 
Court was not required to decide this issue, relying on article 8(2) to justify any 
infringement, there are significant ramifications to a decision that retention does not 
engage article 8 at all. Within days of birth all babies in the UK have a heel prick test to 
remove a small sample of blood in order to screen for a genetic enzyme deficiency. If the 
taking of this sample is the infringement of privacy, and the retention of the sample and the 
information derived from it is not, it would only be a small step to argue that analysis for 
other purposes, such as placing a DNA profile on a database, is not an infringement of 
privacy. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 took us a step closer to a mass database 
for all citizens; to deem the retention not an infringement of privacy would take us even 
closer. 
As stated above the court did not have to determine whether article 8(1) was engaged but, 
assuming it was, felt that it was justified under article 8(2). The retention would clearly 
appear to be in accordance with the law, the key issue is whether it is necessary and 
proportionate. The court presented logical arguments that this is the case, believing that 
infringement, if it exists at all, in respect of retention is relatively slight given the real public 
concern that sexual and violent crime generates. The court also highlighted the fact that 
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the police are not required to destroy the vast amount of evidence collected during the 
investigation of an offence, such as witness statements. However, it does not give 
recognition to the fact that fingerprints and DNA profiles are inherently very personal 
information. The court was relatively dismissive of the argument that an individual who is 
acquitted or against whom proceedings are *Cov. L.J. 42  dropped has a right to be 
returned to the position they were in prior to their encounter with the criminal justice 
system. Considering the strength of feeling that retention of samples can generate this was 
not given sufficient weighting. Expansion of the fingerprint and DNA databases has great 
potential for detection of crime. However, as stated above, it is a very small step from the 
stance taken by the Divisional Court to the placing of all persons on the DNA database. Risk 
of crime is part of a free society; greater monitoring of individuals can reduce the potential 
for crime and enhance detection; the difficulty is deciding where we draw the line. 
 Principal Lecturer in Law, Coventry University 
Cov. L.J. 2002, 7(1), 35-42 
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